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Abstract
This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The
general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting from basic security components,
using a sequence of refinements and transformations, just like logical proofs are derived starting from axioms,
using proof rules and transformations. The claim is that in practice, many protocols are already derived in
such a way, but informally. Capturing this practice in a suitable formalism turns out to be a considerable
task.
The present paper proposes rules for composing security protocols from given security components. In
general, security protocols are, of course, not compositional: information revealed by one may interfere with
the security of the other. However, annotating protocol steps by pre- and post-conditions, allows secure
sequential composition. Establishing that protocol components satisfy each other’s invariants allows more
general forms of composition, ensuring that the individually secure sub-protocols will not interact insecurely
in the composite protocol. The applicability of the method is demonstrated on modular derivations of two
standard protocols, together with their simple security properties.
1 Introduction
Modularity is a central problem in computer security and a proven challenge to
many investigators (including [20,21,22,23,24]). In this paper, we explore modular
construction of network protocols and present a system for reasoning about com-
pound protocols from their parts. In general terms, we address two basic problems
in modular security. The first may be called additive combination – we wish to
combine protocol components in a way that accumulates security properties. For
example, we may wish to combine a basic key exchange protocol with an authen-
tication mechanism to produce a protocol for authenticated key exchange. The
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second basic problem is ensuring nondestructive combination. If two mechanisms
are combined, each serving a separate purpose, then it is important to be sure that
neither one degrades the security properties of the other. For example, if we add an
alternative mode of operation to a protocol, then some party may initiate a session
in one mode and simultaneously respond to another session in another mode, using
the same public key or long-term key in both. Unless the modes are designed not
to interfere, there may be an attack on the multi-mode protocol that would not
arise if only one mode were possible. An interesting illustration of the significants
of nondestructive combination is the construction in [16] which shows that for every
security protocol there is another protocol that interacts with it insecurely.
Recognizing that many common network protocols are built using an accepted
set of standard concepts, we have identified a set of basic components, protocol
composition operations, protocol refinements, and protocol transformations for au-
thentication and key exchange protocols. In [5], we characterize the structure of a
family of key exchange protocols that includes Station-To-Station (STS), ISO-9798-
3, Just Fast Keying (JFK) and related protocols, showing how all the protocols in
this family may be derived systematically. (In order to make this submission more
self-contained, a very cursory overview is contained in Appendix ??.) We have
also constructed systematic derivations of other families of protocols, in each case
showing how a simple starting protocol may be extended, incrementally adding
properties or optimizing performance in each step. While the derivation system
seems a useful tool for developing and understanding protocols, we have not yet
been able to prove that each derivation step is sound for all protocols where it
could be applied. In this paper, we show how to prove correctness of additive and
nondestructive combinations of protocol components.
Intuitively, additive combination is captured by a before-after formalism for
reasoning about steps in protocol execution. Suppose P is a sequence of protocol
steps, and φ and ψ are formulas asserting secrecy of some data, past actions of other
principals, or other facts about a run of a protocol. The triple φ[P ]Aψ means that
if φ is true before principal A does actions P , then ψ will be true afterwards. For
example, the precondition might assert that A knows B’s public key, the actions P
allow A to receive a signed message and verify B’s signature, and the postcondition
may say that B sent the signed message that A received. The importance of before-
after assertions is that we can combine assertions about individual protocol steps to
derive properties of a sequence of steps: if φ[P ]Aψ and ψ[P
′]Aθ, then φ[PP
′]Aθ. For
example, an assertion assuming that keys have been successfully distributed can be
combined with steps that do key distribution to prove properties of a protocol that
distributes keys and uses them.
We ensure nondestructive combination, which is useful for reasoning about run-
ning older versions of a protocol concurrently with current versions (e.g., SSL 2.0
and SSL 3.0) and for verifying protocols like IKE [13] which contain a large number
of sub-protocols, using invariance assertions. The central assertion in our reason-
ing system, Γ ` φ[P ]Aψ, says that in any protocol satisfying the invariant Γ, the
before-after assertion φ[P ]Aψ holds in any run (regardless of any actions by any
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dishonest attacker). Typically, our invariants are statements about principals that
follow the rules of a protocol, as are the final conclusions. For example, an invariant
may state that every honest principal maintains secrecy of its keys, where “honest”
means simply that the principal only performs actions that are given by the proto-
col. A conclusion in such a protocol may be that if Bob is honest (so no one else
knows his key), then after Alice sends and receives certain messages, Alice knows
that she has communicated with Bob. Under the specific conditions described in
this paper, nondestructive combination occurs when two protocols are combined
and neither violates the invariants of the other.
As informally described, “additive combination” and “nondestructive combi-
nation” may seem like overlapping concepts, at least to the degree that additive
combination assumes that the added steps do not destroy any security properties.
In our logic, we factor the two concepts into two separate notions, one for adding
steps to a protocol under some assumed invariants, and another for showing that
a combination of protocol steps preserves a set of invariants. More specifically, if
we want to add an authentication step to a protocol, we first show that the ad-
ditional step preserves the same needed invariants. Then, under the assumption
that invariants are preserved, we combine properties guaranteed by separate steps.
There is some synergy in this approach, since the logical principles used to prove
an invariant are the same as those used to prove protocol properties from a given
set of invariants.
To show the utility of our logic for practical protocols, we present three exam-
ples. Example 6.1 is a formal correctness proof of ISO-9798-3 , constructed by
composing proofs of two parts, a standard signature-based challenge response pro-
tocol [28], and a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [6]. Example 6.2 proves cor-
rectness of a protocol that exchanges certificates to establish public keys, and then
uses public-key cryptography and nonces to establish a shared secret. Example 6.3
combines the two, showing that running any number of instances of ISO-9798-3
and the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol in parallel preserves the security
properties of both. While the formal proofs are somewhat lengthy when written out
in full detail, as in any formal proof system, the proof structure takes advantage
of composition ideas and illustrates the power of a modular approach. Although
the assertions we prove only mention steps of the protocol, the logic is sound in a
stronger sense: each provable assertion about an action or sequence of actions holds
in any run of the protocol that contains the given actions and arbitrary additional
actions by any number of additional principals and malicious attacker(s). This “im-
plicit attacker” method lets us prove security properties of protocols under attack,
while reasoning only about the sequence of actions taken by honest parties in the
protocol.
It is well known that many natural security properties (e.g., noninterference)
are not preserved either under composition or under refinement. This has been
extensively explored using trace-based modeling techniques [20,21,22,23,24], using
properties that are not first-order predicates over traces, but second-order pred-














Fig. 1. ISO-9798-3 as arrows-and-messages
composition and refinement. In contrast, our security properties are safety proper-
ties over sets of traces that satisfy safety invariants, thus avoiding negative results
about composability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the process
calculus that we use for defining the steps of a protocol. The syntax and seman-
tics of the core protocol logic is presented in Section 3. The proof system is pre-
sented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the extensions to the core proof system
used to reason about protocol composition. In Section 6, we illustrate applica-
tions of the logic. In Section 7, we describe previous work on protocol composition
[4,11,12,14,16,18,27,36] and discuss how our formalization can be used to explain
some of those results. Finally, in Section 8, we present our conclusions and propose
some themes for future work.
2 Cord Calculus
Cords [9] are the formalism we use to represent protocols and their parts. They form
an action calculus [29,30,33], based on pi-calculus [31], and related to spi-calculus
[1]. The cords formalism is also similar to the approach of the Chemical Abstract
Machine formalism [3], in that the communication actions can be viewed as reac-
tions between “molecules”. Cord calculus serves as a simple “protocol programming
language” which supports our Floyd-Hoare style logical annotations, and verifica-
tions in an axiomatic semantics. Cord calculus is presented in [9]. In order to make
this paper self-contained, a brief summary is included in Appendix A.
In this section, we illustrate with an example how protocols are represented in
cord calculus. Figure 1 shows the ISO-9798-3 protocol [15] in the informal arrows-
and-messages notation which is commonly used to describe security protocols. The
same protocol is written out in the language of cord calculus in Figure 2. The
common point between the two is that a protocol is described by listing out the
sequence of actions that honest parties would execute in a run. In this example,
the protocol consists of two roles, the initiator role and the responder role. The
sequence of actions in the initiator role are given by the cord A in Figure 2. In
words, the actions are: generate a fresh random number; send a message with
the Diffie-Hellman exponential of that number to the peer, Bˆ; receive a message
with source address Bˆ; verify that the message contains Bˆ’s signature over data
in the expected format; and finally, send another message to Bˆ with the initiator’s
signature over the Diffie-Hellman exponential that she sent in the first message, the
data she received from Bˆ (which should be a Diffie-Hellman exponential generated
by Bˆ) and Bˆ’s identity. The notations (νx), 〈t〉, (x) refer respectively to the actions
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Fig. 2. ISO-9798-3 as a cord space
of nonce generation, sending a term and receiving a message. Here, a message is
assumed to be of the form: (source, destination, content). Detailed syntax of cord
calculus is presented in Appendix A.
3 A Protocol Logic
3.1 Syntax
The formulas of the logic are given by the grammar in Table 1, where ρ may be
any role, written using the notation of cord calculus. Here, t and P denote a
term and a process respectively. We use the word process to refer to a principal
executing an instance of a role, e.g., Alice taking part in a session of a protocol
in the initiator role. As a notational convention, we use X to refer to a process
belonging to principal Xˆ . We use φ and ψ to indicate predicate formulas, and m to
indicate a generic term we call a “message”. m is of the form (source, destination,
protocol-identifier, content), i.e., each message has source and destination fields
and a unique protocol identifier besides the contents. Note that the source field of a
message may not be the same as the actual sender of the message since the intruder
can spoof the source address. Also, the principal identified by the destination
field may not receive the message since the intruder can intercept messages. The
source and destination fields in the message are useful while proving authentication
properties of protocols. When an honest principal sends out a message, the source
field identifies her and the destination field identifies the intended recipient. Our
formalization of authentication is based on the notion of matching records of runs
[7] which requires that whenever Aˆ and Bˆ accept each other’s identities at the end
of a run, their records of the run should match, i.e., each message that Aˆ sent was
received by Bˆ and vice versa, each send event happened before the corresponding
receive event, and moreover the messages sent by each principal (Aˆ or Bˆ) appear in
the same order in both the records. Including the source and destination fields in the
message allows us to match up send-receive actions. Since in this paper, we reason
about correctness of a protocol in an environment in which other protocols may
be executing concurrently, it is important that when Aˆ and Bˆ accept each other’s
identities, they also agree on which protocol they have successfully completed with
the other. One way to extend the matching histories characterization to capture
this requirement is by adding protocol identifiers to messages. Now if Aˆ and Bˆ
have matching histories at the end of a run, not only do they agree on the source,
destination and content of each message, but also on which protocol this run is an
instance of.
Most protocol proofs use formulas of the form θ[P ]Xφ, which means that after
actions P are executed in process X, starting from a state where formula θ is true,
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formula φ is true about the resulting state of X. Here are the informal interpre-
tations of the predicates, with the basis for defining precise semantics discussed in
the next section.
The formula Has(X,x) means that principal Xˆ possesses information x in the
process X. This is “possesses” in the limited sense of having either generated the
data or received it in the clear or received it under encryption where the decryp-
tion key is known. The formula Send(X,m) means that the last action in a run
of the protocol corresponds to principal Xˆ sending message m in in the process
X. Receive(X,m), New(X, t), Decrypt(X, t), and Verify(X, t) are similarly associ-
ated with the receive, new, decrypt and signature verification actions of a protocol.
Fresh(X, t) means that the term t generated in X is “fresh” in the sense that no one
else has seen any term containing t as a subterm. Typically, a fresh term will be a
nonce and freshness will be used to reason about the temporal ordering of actions
in runs of a protocol. This form of reasoning is useful in proving authentication
properties of protocols. The formula Honest(Xˆ) means that the actions of principal
Xˆ in the current run are precisely an interleaving of initial segments of traces of
a set of roles of the protocol. In other words, Xˆ assumes some set of roles and
does exactly the actions prescribed by them. Contains(t1, t2) means that t2 is a
subterm of t1. This predicate helps us identify the components of a message. The
two temporal operators and have the same meaning as in Linear Temporal Logic
[19]. Since we view a run as a linear sequence of states, φ means that in some
state in the past φ holds, whereas φ means that in the previous state φ holds. The
predicate After(a1, a2) means that the action a2 happened after the action a1 in a
run. In this paper, we restrict attention to protocol roles in which all actions are
unique. In particular, a principal executing a role of a protocol does not send the
same message twice. This seems like a reasonable assumption since even if she did
send two messages with the same content, she would probably distinguish the two
by using message sequence numbers or a similar mechanism. The technical benefit
of this assumption is that After becomes a transitive relation for actions executed
by honest principals.
We note here that the temporal operator and some of the predicates (Send,
Receive) bear semblance to those used in NPATRL [35], the temporal requirements
language for the NRL Protocol Analyzer [25,26]. However, while NPATRL is used
for specifying protocol requirements, our logic is also used to infer properties of
protocols. This leads to essential semantical differences.
3.2 Semantics
A formula may be true or false at a run of a protocol. More precisely, the main
semantic relation, Q, R |= φ, may be read, “formula φ holds for run R of protocol
Q.” In this relation, R may be a complete run, with all sessions that are started in
the run completed, or an incomplete run with some principals waiting for additional
messages to complete one or more sessions. If Q is a protocol, then let Q¯ be the set
of all initial configurations of protocol Q, each including a possible intruder cord.
Let Runs(Q¯) be the set of all runs of protocol Q with intruder, each a sequence of
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Action formulas
a ::= Send(P,m) |Receive(P,m) |New(P, t) |Decrypt(P, t) |Verify(P, t)
Formulas
φ ::= a |Has(P, t) |Fresh(P, t) |Honest(N) |Contains(t1, t2) |
φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | ∃x.φ | φ | φ
Modal forms
Ψ ::= ρ φ |φ ρ φ
After(a,b) ≡ (b ∧ a)
Table 1
Syntax of the logic
reaction steps within a cord space. If φ has free variables, then Q,R |= φ if we have
Q,R |= σφ for all substitutions σ that eliminate all the free variables in φ. We write
Q |= φ if Q, R |= φ for all R ∈ Runs(Q¯).
The inductive definition of Q,R |= φ is given in Appendix B. The main idea is
to view a run as a sequence of reaction steps within a cord space. Each reaction
step corresponds to a principal executing an action. It therefore becomes possible
to assert whether a particular action occurred in a given run and also to make
assertions about the temporal ordering of the actions. An alternative view, similar
to the execution model used in defining Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) semantics, is
to think of a run as a linear sequence of states. Transition from one state to the
next is effected by an action carried out by some principal in some role. Associating
that action with the state that the system ends up in as a consequence, allows us
to use the well-understood terminology of LTL in our logic. A formula is true in a
run if it is true in the last state of that run. An action formula a is therefore true
in a run if it is the last action in that run. On the other hand, a past formula a
is true if in the past the action formula a was true in some state, i.e., if the action
had occurred in the past.
4 Proof System
4.1 Axioms for Protocol Actions
The axioms about protocol actions are listed in Table 2. All the axioms state
properties that hold in the state reached by executing one of the actions in a state
in which formula φ holds. Note that the a in axiom AA1 is any one of the 5 actions
and a is the corresponding predicate in the logic. AA1 states that if a principal has
executed an action in some role, then the corresponding predicate asserting that
the action had occurred in the past is true. Also, in the previous state, φ is true. If
process X generates a new value n and does no further actions, then axiom AN1
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AA1 φ[a]X (a ∧ φ)
AN1 φ[(νn)]X Has(X,n)




Axioms for protocol actions
says that X knows n, AN2 says that no one else knows n, and AN3 says that n is
fresh. AR1 says that if X has received a message m, then she knows m.
4.2 Axioms relating Atomic Predicates
Table 3 lists axioms relating various propositional properties, most of which follow
naturally from the semantics of propositional formulas. For example, DEC states
that if X decrypts {|n|}K , then X knows n because that is the result of the decryp-
tion, and PROJ states that if a process knows a tuple x, y then he also knows x
and y. VER and SEC respectively refer to the unforgeability of signatures and
the need to possess the private key in order to decrypt a message encrypted with
the corresponding public key. The additional condition requiring principal Xˆ to be
honest guarantees that the intruder is not in possession of the private keys. The
above described four axioms together provide an abstraction of the standard Dolev-
Yao intruder model [8]. An important axiom is N1 which states that if a process X
has generated a value n, then that value is distinct from all other values generated
in all other roles. N2 states that freshly generated values are distinct from Diffie-
Hellman exponentials. F1 states that fresh values generated in different processes
are distinct. N1, N2, and F1 together capture the intuition that fresh nonces and
Diffie-Hellman exponentials are unique. Finally, CON states that the tuple x, y
contains x and y as subterms.
4.3 Inference Rules, Preservation and Freshness Loss Axioms
Table 4 collects the inference rules and some additional axioms. The generic infer-
ence rules follow naturally from the semantics. G2 is exactly of the same form as
the rule of consequence in Hoare Logic. It is clear that most predicates are pre-
served by additional actions. For example, if in some state Has(X,n) holds, then
it continues to hold, when X executes additional actions. Intuitively, if a process
possesses some information at a point in a run, then she remembers it for the rest
of the run. Note, however, that the Fresh predicate is not preserved if the freshly
generated value n is sent out in a message (see F).
4.4 Axioms and Rules for Temporal Ordering
In order to prove mutual authentication, we need to reason about the temporal
ordering of actions carried out by different processes. For this purpose, we use
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Axioms Capturing Dolev-Yao Model:
DEC Decrypt(X, {|n|}K ) ⊃ Has(X,n)
PROJ Has(X, (x, y)) ⊃ Has(X,x) ∧ Has(X, y)
SEC Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Decrypt(Y, {|n|}X ) ⊃ (Yˆ = Xˆ)
VER Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Verify(Y, {|n|}X ) ⊃
∃X.∃m.(Send(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, {|n|}X))
Axioms Capturing Uniqueness of Nonces:
N1 New(X,n) ∧ New(Y, n) ⊃ (X = Y )
N2 New(X, p) ⊃ ¬New(Y, gp)
F1 Fresh(X,n) ∧ Fresh(Y, n) ⊃ (X = Y )
Axiom Capturing Subterm Relationship:




θ[P ]Xφ θ[P ]Xψ
G1
θ[P ]Xφ ∧ ψ
θ[P ]Xφ θ










Preservation Axioms: (For Persist ∈ {Has, φ},)
P1 Persist(X, t)[a]XPersist(X, t)
P2 Fresh(X, t)[a]XFresh(X, t), where (t 6⊆ a) ∨ (a 6= 〈m〉)
P3 HasAlone(X, t)[a]XHasAlone(X, t), where (t 6⊆v a) ∨ (a 6= 〈m〉)
Freshness Loss Axiom:
F Fresh(X, t)[〈m〉]X¬Fresh(X, t), where (t ⊆ m)
Table 4
Generic Rules, Preservation and Freshness Loss Axioms
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PLTL Axioms:
T1 (φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ ( φ ∧ ψ)






Temporal Ordering of actions:
AF1 θ[a1 . . . an]X After(a1, a2) ∧ . . . ∧ After(an−1, an)
AF2 Honest(Xˆ) ∧ Honest(Yˆ ) ∧ Honest(Zˆ) ⊃
(After(a1(X), a2(Y )) ∧ After(a2(Y), a3(Z)) ⊃ After(a1(X), a3(Z)))
Fresh(X,n)[〈m〉P ]X (φ ⊃ a2(Y ))
AF3
Fresh(X,n)[〈m〉P ]X (φ ⊃ After(Send(X,m), a2))
(X 6= Y ) ∧ (n ⊆ m, a2)
θ[Pa2]X (φ ⊃ (Send(Y,m) ∧ Fresh(Y, n)))
AF4
θ[Pa2]X (φ ⊃ After(Send(Y,m), a2))
(X 6= Y ) ∧ (n ⊆ m, a2)
Table 5
Axioms and rules for temporal ordering
a fragment of the proof system for Propositional Linear Temporal Logic, PLTL
(Table 5). See [34] for a complete axiomatization of PLTL. The axioms and rules
specific to the temporal ordering of actions are presented in Table 5. The first
two rules are fairly straightforward. AF1 orders the actions within a role. This
is consistent with the way we view a role as an ordered sequence of actions. AF2
states that the After relation is transitive on actions executed by honest participants.
It makes sense since we assume that in a role of a protocol, an honest principal does
not send the same message twice. AF3 and AF4 use the freshness of nonces to
reason about the ordering of actions carried out by different processes. Intuitively,
AF3 states that if a process X creates a fresh value n and then sends out a message
containing it as a subterm, then any action carried out by any other process which
involves n (e.g. if Y receives a message containing n inside a signature), happens
after the send action. AF4 is similar except for the fact that the roles of X and Y
are reversed.
4.5 The Honesty Rule
The honesty rule is essentially an invariance rule for proving properties of all roles
of a protocol. It is similar to the basic invariance rule of LTL [19]. The honesty
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rule is used to combine facts about one role with inferred actions of other roles. For
example, suppose Alice receives a response from a message sent to Bob. Alice may
wish to use properties of Bob’s role to reason about how Bob generated his reply. In
order to do so, Alice may assume that Bob is honest and derive consequences from
this assumption. Since honesty, by definition in our framework, means “following
one or more roles of the protocol,” honest principals must satisfy every property
that is a provable invariant of the protocol roles.
Recall that a protocol Q is a set of roles, Q = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk}. If ρ ∈ Q is a role
of protocol Q, we write PBS(ρ) if P is a continuous segment of the actions of role
ρ such that (a) P is the empty sequence; or (b) P starts at the beginning of ρ and
goes upto the first receive ; or (c) P starts from a receive action and goes upto the
next receive action; or (d) P starts from the last receive action and continues till
the end of the role. We call such a P a basic sequence of role ρ. The reason for only
considering segments starting from a read and continuing till the next read is that
if a role contains a send, the send may be done asynchronously without waiting for
another role to receive. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that
the only “pausing” states of a principal are those where the role is waiting for input.
If a role calls for a message to be sent, then we dictate that the principal following
this role must complete the send before pausing.
Since the honesty rule depends on the protocol, we write Q ` θ[P ]φ if θ[P ]φ is
provable using the honesty rule for Q and the other axioms and proof rules. Using
the notation just introduced, the honesty rule may be written as follows.
[ ]X φ ∀ρ ∈ Q.∀PBS(ρ). φ [P ]X φ
HON
Q ` Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ
no free variable in φ
except X bound in
[P ]X
In words, if φ holds at the beginning of every role of Q and is preserved by all
its basic sequences, then every honest principal executing protocol Q must satisfy
φ. The side condition prevents free variables in the conclusion Honest(Xˆ) ⊃ φ from
becoming bound in any hypothesis. Intuitively, since φ holds in the initial state and
is preserved by all basic sequences, it holds at all pausing states of any run.
5 Formalizing Protocol Composition
Until this point, protocols have been analyzed in isolation. In this section, we extend
the deductive system to reason about protocol composition. In doing so, we address
the two ways in which composition problems can arise in security protocol analysis.
Both arise out of complexity. In one case, we wish to gain control of complexity by
building up a proof of correctness of a complex protocol from proofs of correctness
of its component sub-protocols. In the other, we want to avoid insecure interactions
between different protocols or different versions of the same protocol that may be




Γ ∪ Γ′ ` φ
Γ ` φ1[P ]Aφ2 Γ ` φ2[P
′]Aφ3
C1
Γ ` φ1[P ;P
′]Aφ3
Q ` Γ Q′ ` Γ
C2
Q ◦ Q′ ` Γ
Table 6
Composition Rules
The protocol composition rules are collected in Table 6. Γ denotes a set of
formulas which we refer to as environment invariants. The idea is to capture, using
these formulas, the constraints that the environment must satisfy in order to enable
a specific protocol to retain its security property. Typically, these constraints will
impose restrictions on the actions of the honest principals, i.e., the principals who
are faithfully executing one or more of the protocols running in the environment. We
write Γ ` φ if φ is provable using the formulas in Γ and the axioms and proof rules
of the deductive system. The semantic entailment, Γ |= φ, is defined in Appendix B.
Essentially, it says, that in any run in which the invariants in Γ hold, the formula
φ is true.
The weakening rule, W, states that a formula φ which is provable from a set
of hypotheses, Γ, remains provable if additional formulas are added to the set of
hypotheses. The protocol composition rule C1 gives us a way of sequentially com-
posing two roles P and P ′ when the logical formula guaranteed by the execution
of P , i.e., the post-condition of P , matches the pre-condition required in order to
ensure that P ′ achieves some property. As before, Γ denotes a set of hypotheses
which are used in proving the properties of the protocols. This form of reasoning
allows a proof of correctness of a protocol to be built up incrementally from a proof
of its component sub-protocols. The other composition rule C2 states that if the
environment invariants hold for two protocols, Q and Q′, then the invariants also
hold for their composition. This rule is sound if the formulas in Γ capture trace-
based invariants, which are proved using the honesty rule in our deductive system.
Soundness proofs of the rules in Table 6 are presented in Appendix C.
If Q and Q′ are protocols, then we define Q ◦ Q′ to be any protocol such that
every role ρ in Q ◦ Q′ is a concatenation of basic sequences of roles in Q or Q′.
Therefore, every ρ ∈ Q ◦ Q′ can be written as ρ = ρ1ρ2 . . . ρn where every ρi is a
basic sequence of a role in Q or Q′. Note that sequential and parallel composition
arise as special cases of this general composition operation.
Our general methodology for proving protocol composition results involves the
following steps:
(i) Prove separately the security properties of protocols Q and Q′.
(ii) Identify the set of environment invariants used in the two proofs, Γ and Γ′.
The formulas included in these sets will typically be the formulas in the two
proofs, which were proved using the honesty rule.
(iii) Apply the weakening rule so that Γ ∪ Γ′ represents the set of environment
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invariants that will be used while applying the composition rules C1 and C2.
This step is required in case of sequential composition or if we want to prove
that the properties of both Q and Q′ are preserved by the composition process.
However, if the goal is to just prove that the properties of Q are preserved,
then the set of environment invariants that will be used while applying C1 and
C2 will simply be Γ.
(iv) When the post-condition of a role of Q matches the pre-condition of the corre-
sponding role of Q′, sequentially compose the two roles by applying rule C1.
This step is required only in the case of sequential composition.
(v) Prove that the environment invariants used in proving the properties of the
protocols, Γ∪ Γ′, hold for both the protocols. Since Q ` Γ was already proved
in Step 1, in this step, it is sufficient to show that Q ` Γ′ and similarly that
Q′ ` Γ. If Step 3 was skipped, then it is sufficient to just show that Q′ ` Γ.
Note that in proving a composition result (whether sequential or parallel), we
always prove that the two protocols under consideration respect each other’s invari-
ants (Step 5), i.e., that they do not interact insecurely. In addition, while proving
that two protocols can be sequentially composed, we require that the post-condition
of the first matches the pre-condition of the second (Step 4). Thus, in proving a
sequential composition result, we address the two central problems of compositional
protocol analysis mentioned in the beginning of the section.
6 Examples of Protocol Composition
In this section, we illustrate the use of the methodology outlined in the previous
section, by presenting modular proofs of two standard protocols, ISO-9798-3 [15]
and NSL [32,17]. The parallel composition of these two protocols is also proved
secure. Due to space constraints, we only present the the proof of ISO-9798-3 in
its entirety, and sketch an outline of the NSL proof and the proof of correctness of
their parallel composition.
Example 6.1 The ISO-9798-3 Protocol
The ISO-9798-3 protocol is constructed by a sequential composition of a proto-
col based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and the standard signature-
based challenge-response protocol. Here, we prove the key secrecy property of the
Diffie-Hellman protocol and the mutual authentication property of the challenge-
response protocol. We then prove that the ISO-9798-3 protocol can be used to
establish an authenticated shared secret by composing the correctness proofs of
these two protocols.
Challenge Response Protocol, CR:
Our formulation of authentication is based on the concept of matching conver-
sations [2] and is similar to the idea of proving authentication using correspondence
assertions [37]. The same basic idea is also presented in [7] where it is referred to
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as matching records of runs. Simply put, it requires that whenever Aˆ and Bˆ accept
each other’s identities at the end of a run, their records of the run match, i.e., each
message that Aˆ sent was received by Bˆ and vice versa, each send event happened
before the corresponding receive event, and moreover the messages sent by each
principal (Aˆ or Bˆ) appear in the same order in both the records.
A complete proof of the mutual authentication property guaranteed by executing
the CR protocol is presented in Table ?? in Appendix ??. The final property proved
about the initiator role (referred as φauth henceforth) is of the form: precondition
[actions] postcondition, where:
precondition = Fresh(A,m)
actions = [〈Aˆ, Bˆ,m〉(Bˆ, Aˆ, n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B/Bˆ, Aˆ, y, z)
(z/{|m, y, Aˆ|}B)〈Aˆ, Bˆ, {|m, y, Bˆ|}A〉]A
postcondition = Honest(Bˆ) ⊃ ActionsInOrder(
Send(A, {Aˆ, Bˆ,m}),
Receive(B, {Aˆ, Bˆ,m}),
Send(B, {Bˆ, Aˆ, {n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B}}),
Receive(A, {Bˆ, Aˆ, {n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B}}))
Here, the predicate ActionsInOrder(a1, a2, . . . , an) means that the actions a1, a2,
. . . , an were executed in that order. Intuitively, this formula means that after
executing the actions in the initiator role purportedly with Bˆ, Aˆ is guaranteed that
her record of the run matches that of Bˆ, provided that Bˆ is honest. The set of
environmental invariants used in this proof, Γ, contains only one formula (line (9)
of Table ??), i.e.,
Γ = { Honest(Bˆ) ⊃ (
( Send(B,m0) ∧ Contains(m0, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B) ∧ ¬Fresh(B,m) ) ⊃ (
m0 = {Bˆ, Aˆ, {n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B}}∧
(Send(B, {Bˆ, Aˆ, {n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B}}) ∧ Fresh(B,n))∧
ActionsInOrder(Receive(B, {Aˆ, Bˆ,m}),
Send(B, {Bˆ, Aˆ, {n, {|m,n, Aˆ|}B}}))
) ) }
Intuitively, this invariant states that whenever honest Bˆ signs a term which is a triple
with the third component Aˆ, and the first component was not freshly generated by
Bˆ, then it is the case that this signature was sent as part of the second message of
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DH1 Computes(X, gab) ⊃ Has(X, gab)
DH2 Has(X, gab) ⊃
(Computes(X, gab) ∨ ∃m.( Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)))
DH3 ( Receive(X,m) ∧ Contains(m, gab)) ⊃
∃Y,m′.(Computes(Y, gab) ∧ Send(Y,m′) ∧ Contains(m′, gab))
DH4 Fresh(X, a) ⊃ Fresh(X, ga)
Computes(X, gab) ≡ ( (Has(X, a) ∧ Has(X, gb)) ∨ (Has(X, b) ∧ Has(X, ga)) )
Table 7
Diffie-Hellman Axioms
the CR protocol. (Note that each message sent and received has the protocol-id in
it. We omit these to improve readability).
Base Diffie Hellman Protocol, DH0:
The DH0 protocol involves generating a fresh random number and computing
its Diffie-Hellman exponential. It is therefore the initial part of the standard Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol. In order to reason about the security property
of this protocol, the term language and the protocol logic have to be enriched to
allow reasoning about Diffie-Hellman computation. The terms g(a) and h(a, b),
respectively representing the Diffie-Hellman exponential gamodp and the Diffie-
Hellman secret gabmodp, are added to the term language. To improve readability,
we will use ga and gab instead of g(a) and h(a, b). Table 7 presents the rules specific
to the way that Diffie-Hellman secrets are computed. The predicate Computes() is
used as a shorthand to denote the fact that the only way to compute a Diffie-Hellman
secret is to possess one exponent and the other exponential. DH1 states that if X
can compute the Diffie-Hellman secret, then she also possesses it. DH2 captures the
intuition that the only way to possess a Diffie-Hellman secret is to either compute
it directly or obtain it from a received message containing it. DH3 states that
if a principal receives a message containing a Diffie-Hellman secret, someone who
has computed the secret must have previously sent a (possibly different) message
containing it. DH4 captures the intuition that if a is fresh at some point of a run,
then ga is also fresh at that point.
The property of the initiator role of the DH0 protocol is given by the formula
below.
[(νa)]AHasAlone(A, a) ∧ Fresh(A, g
a)
This formula follows easily from the axioms and rules of the logic. It states that
after carrying out the initiator role of DH0, A possesses a fresh Diffie-Hellman
exponential ga and is the only one who possesses the exponent a. This property
will be useful in proving the secrecy condition of the ISO-9798-3 protocol. The set
of environmental invariants used in this proof, Γ′, is empty.
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Composing the Protocols:
We now prove the security properties of the ISO-9798-3 protocol by composing
the correctness proofs of DH0 and CR. In doing so, we follow the general method-
ology for proving composition results outlined in Section 5. Let us go back and look
at the form of the logical formulas characterizing the initiator roles of DH0 and
CR:
DH0 : Γ
′ ` [InitDH0 ]A Fresh(A, g
a)
CR : Γ ` Fresh(A,m) [InitCR]A φauth
At this point, steps 1 and 2 of the general methodology have already been carried
out. We now apply the weakening rule to both the formulas above (step 3). Since
Γ′ is empty, Γ ∪ Γ′ is simply Γ. Note that the post-condition of DH0 matches the
pre-condition of CR. We can therefore compose the two formulas by applying the
composition rule C1 (step 4). The resulting formula is:
ISO-9798-3 (auth.) : Γ ` [InitDH0 ; InitCR]A φauth
The result of composing the two roles is that the freshly generated Diffie-Hellman
exponential is substituted for the nonce in the challenge-response cord. The result-
ing role is precisely the initiator role of the ISO-9798-3 protocol. The formula above
states that the mutual authentication property of CR is preserved by the compo-
sition process assuming that the environmental invariants in Γ are still satisfied.
Finally, using the honesty rule, it is easily proved that DH0 respects the environ-
mental invariants in Γ (step 5). Therefore, by applying the composition rule C2,
we conclude that the sequential composition of DH0 and CR, which is ISO-9798-3
, respects the invariants in Γ. This completes the composition proof for the mutual
authentication property.
The other main step involves proving that the secrecy property of DH0 is pre-
served by CR, since the CR protocol does not reveal the Diffie-Hellman exponents.
DH0 : ` [InitDH0 ]AHasAlone(A, a)
CR′ : ` HasAlone(A, a) [InitCR′ ]AHasAlone(A, a)
Here, CR′ is the same protocol as CR except that ga is substituted for the nonce
m. Therefore, by applying the composition rule C1 again, we have the secrecy
condition for the ISO-9798-3 protocol:
ISO-9798-3 (secrecy) :
` [InitDH0 ; InitCR]AHasAlone(A, a)
Since the set of environment invariants is empty, steps 3 and 5 follow trivially.
The rest of the proof uses properties of the Diffie-Hellman method of secret compu-
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tation to prove the following logical formula:
ISO-9798-3 (shared-secret) : [InitDH0 ; InitCR]AHonest(Bˆ) ⊃
(n = gb0 ∧ Has(A, gab0) ∧ (Has(X, gab0) ⊃
(X = A ∨X = B)))
Intuitively, the property proved is that if Bˆ is honest, then Aˆ and Bˆ are the only
people who know the Diffie-Hellman secret gab. In other words, the ISO-9798-3
protocol can be used to compute an authenticated shared secret. The complete
proof is presented in Table ?? in Appendix ??. It requires another invariant (line
(3)) capturing the intuition that the honest agents sign Diffie-Hellman exponentials
only.
Example 6.2 The NSL Protocol
The 7 message NSL protocol can be proved correct by sequential composition of
two protocols, which we refer to as NSL-init and NSL-base . By running NSL-init ,
a principal obtains the public key certificate of a peer from the server. If a principal
possesses a peer’s public key certificate, she can run NSL-base with him and set up
an authenticated shared secret. In our formalism, the postcondition of NSL-init is
that the principal knows a peer’s public key certificate. Also, with a precondition
capturing the same property, NSL-base has a postcondition stating that the two
principals possess a shared secret. Thus, the two protocols can be composed using
the composition rule C1. The resulting protocol is NSL . Moreover, it can be proved
that the two protocols respect each other’s invariants, allowing us to conclude that
the NSL protocol can be used to set up a shared secret. A part of this proof appears
in [9].
Example 6.3 Parallel Composition of ISO-9798-3 and NSL
Since ISO-9798-3 and NSL respect each other’s invariants, their parallel com-
position can also be proved secure using our formalism. The main insight from
this proof is that if the authenticators of two protocols (which are individually se-
cure) cannot be confused with each other, then their composition is secure. Disjoint
encryption, which has been suggested as a design principle to avoid insecure inter-
action between protocols [4,12], appears to be a special case of this more general
principle.
7 Related Work
Early work on the protocol composition problem concentrated on designing proto-
cols that would be guaranteed to compose with any other protocol. This led to
rather stringent constraints on protocols: in essence, they required the fail-stop
property [11] or something very similar to it [14]. Since real-world protocols are not
designed in this manner, these approaches did not have much practical application.
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More recent work has therefore focussed on reducing the amount of work that is
required to show that protocols are composable. Meadows, in her analysis of the
IKE protocol suite using the NRL Protocol Analyzer [27], proved that the different
sub-protocols did not interact insecurely with each other by restricting attention to
only those parts of the sub-protocols, which had a chance of subverting each other’s
security goals. Independently, Thayer, Herzog and Guttman used a similar insight
to develop a technique for proving composition results using their strand space
model [36]. Their technique consisted in showing that a set of terms generated by
one protocol can never be accepted by principals executing the other protocol. The
techniques used for choosing the set of terms, however, is specific to the protocols
in [10]. A somewhat different approach is used by Lynch [18] to prove that the
composition of a simple shared key communication protocol and the Diffie-Hellman
key distribution protocol is secure. Her model uses I/O automata and the protocols
are shown to compose if adversaries are only passive eavesdroppers.
In a recent paper [4], Canetti, Meadows and Syverson, revisit the protocol com-
position problem. They show how the interaction between a protocol and its en-
vironment can have a major effect on the security properties of the protocol. In
particular, they demonstrate a number of attacks on published and widely used
protocols that are not feasible against the protocol running in isolation but become
feasible in some environments. The main question that this study leaves open is:
how should the environment be constrained so that it does not subvert the security
goals of a protocol? The authors put forward some rules of thumb that could be
useful in answering this question. Of these, at least two can be justified using our
formalization. The first of these states that the environment should not use keys
or other secrets in unaltered form. Specifically, the protocol under consideration
should not encrypt messages with a key used to encrypt messages by any protocol
in its environment. The reason this makes sense is that if two protocols use a par-
ticular form of encrypted message as a test to authenticate a peer, then the attacker
might be able to make a principal running the first protocol accept a message which
actually originated in a run of the second protocol. In our formalism, the envi-
ronmental invariant for the protocol under consideration would fail to hold in such
an environment, and the composition proof would therefore not go through. We
note that this principle has been followed in the design of real-world protocols like
IKE [13]. Also, Guttman and Fa´brega have proved a theoretical result to the same
effect in their strand space model [12]. The other rule of thumb (also recommended
by Kelsey, Schneier and Wagner in [16]), is the use of unique protocol identifiers to
prevent a message intended for use in one protocol to be mistaken for use in another
protocol. This rule can also be similarly justified.
8 Conclusions
A modular approach towards construction and analysis of systems, which is often
seen in other areas of computer science, does not seem to work very easily in com-
puter security. The main problem is that systems which are individually secure
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might lose their security when they are put together because of the way they inter-
act with each other. In this paper, we have presented a methodology for modular
reasoning about security protocols. While doing so, we have addressed two basic
problems: (a) how do you construct a protocol from smaller sub-protocols? (b)
how do you prove that two protocols which are individually secure are also secure
while running concurrently? In our formalism, we use before-after assertions to
address the first problem and protocol invariants to address the second. The use
of the methodology is illustrated by presenting modular proofs involving practical
protocols, ISO-9798-3 and NSL . This formalism also justifies some design princi-
ples which have been used by protocol designers in the construction of real-world
protocols (e.g. IKE) and submuses some previous work in the formal methods com-
munity on the protocol composition problem. Future work would include a deeper
investigation of the limits and applicability of this method and its connection with
other approaches for reasoning about correctness of protocols. Also, it would be an
interesting challenge to automate the proof system.
References
[1] M. Abadi and A. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus. Information and
Computation, 148(1):1–70, 1999. Expanded version available as SRC Research Report 149 (January
1998).
[2] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribution. In Advances in Cryprtology -
Crypto ’93 Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, 1994.
[3] G. Berry and G. Boudol. The chemical abstract machine. Theoretical Computer Science, 96:217–248,
1992.
[4] R. Canetti, C. Meadows, and P. Syverson. Environmental requirements for authentication protocols. In
Proceedings of Software Security - Theories and Systems, Mext-NSF-JSPS International Symposium,
ISSS, LNCS 2609, pages 339–355. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[5] A. Datta, A. Derek, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Pavlovic. A derivation system for security protocols and its
logical formalization. In Proceedings of 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages
109–125. IEEE, 2003.
[6] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, IT-22(6):644–654, 1976.
[7] W. Diffie, P. C. Van Oorschot, and M. J. Wiener. Authentication and authenticated key exchanges.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 2:107–125, 1992.
[8] D. Dolev and A. Yao. On the security of public-key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, 2(29), 1983.
[9] N. Durgin, J. C. Mitchell, and D. Pavlovic. A compositional logic for protocol correctness. In
Proceedings of 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 241–255. IEEE, 2001.
[10] F. J. T. Fa´brega, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman. Strand spaces: Why is a security protocol correct?
In Proceedings of the 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 160–171, Oakland, CA,
May 1998. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[11] L. Gong and P. Syverson. Fail-stop protocols: An approach to designing secure protocols. Dependable
Computing for Critical Applications, 5:79–100, 1998.
[12] J. Guttman and F. J. T. Fa´brega. Protocol independence through disjoint encryption. In Proceedings
of 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 24–34. IEEE, 2000.
[13] D. Harkins and D. Carrel. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 1998. RFC 2409.
[14] N. Heintze and J. D. Tygar. A model for secure protocols and their composition. IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering, 22(1):16–30, January 1996.
219
[15] IEEE. Entity authentication mechanisms – part 3: Entity authentication using asymmetric techniques.
Technical report ISO/IEC IS 9798-3, ISO/IEC, 1993.
[16] J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, and D. Wagner. Protocol interactions and the chosen protocol attack. In
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols, April 1997.
[17] G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using CSP and FDR. In
2nd International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems.
Springer-Verlag, 1996.
[18] N. Lynch. I/O automata models and proofs for shared-key communication systems. In Proceedings of
12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 14–29. IEEE, 1999.
[19] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli. Temporal Verification of Reactive Systems: Safety. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
[20] H. Mantel. On the Composition of Secure Systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 88–101, Oakland, CA, USA, May 12–15 2002. IEEE Computer Society.
[21] D. McCullough. Noninterference and the composability of security properties. In Proceedings of the
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 177–186, Oakland, CA, USA, May 1988. IEEE
Computer Society.
[22] D. McCullough. A hookup theorem for multilevel security. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 16(6):563–568, 1990.
[23] J. McLean. Security models and information flow. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, May 1990. IEEE Computer Society.
[24] J. McLean. A general theory of composition for a class of “possibilistic” properties. IEEE Transactions
on Software Engineering, 22(1):53–67, 1996.
[25] C. Meadows. A model of computation for the NRL protocol analyzer. In Proceedings of 7th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 84–89. IEEE, 1994.
[26] C. Meadows. The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview. Journal of Logic Programming, 26(2):113–131,
1996.
[27] C. Meadows. Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange protocol using the NRL protocol analyzer. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 1998.
[28] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC
Press, 1996.
[29] R. Milner. Action structures. LFCS report ECS-LFCS-92-249, Department of Computer Science,
University of Edinburgh, JCMB, The Kings Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh, December 1992.
[30] R. Milner. Action calculi and the pi-calculus. In NATO Summer School on Logic and Computation,
Marktoberdorf, November 1993.
[31] R. Milner. Communicating and Mobile Systems: The pi-Calculus. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, U.K, 1999.
[32] R.M. Needham and M.D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of
computers. Communications of the ACM, 21(12):993–999, 1978.
[33] D. Pavlovic. Categorical logic of names and abstraction in action calculi. Math. Structures in Comp.
Sci., 7(6):619–637, 1997.
[34] D. Peled. Software Reliability Methods. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[35] P. Syverson and C. Meadows. A formal language for cryptographic protocol requirements. Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, 7(1-2):27–59, 1996.
[36] F. J. Thayer, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman. Mixed strand spaces. In Proceedings of 12th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE, 1999.
[37] T. Y. C. Woo and S. C. Lam. A semantic model for authentication protocols. In Proceedings IEEE
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 1993.
A Cord Calculus
Cord calculus is the formalism we use to represent protocols. The main concepts
are collected in this section.
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A.1 Terms, Actions, Strands and Cords
The terms t are built starting from the variables x and the constants c. Moreover,
the set of basic terms also contains the names N , which can be variables Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ,
or constants Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, and keys K which can be variables y and constants k. Upon
these basic sets, the term language is then generated by some given constructors
p, which always include tupling, the public key encryption {|t|}K of the term t by
the key K, and the signature {|t|}K over the term t with the private key K¯. The
language of actions is then built upon the terms by further constructors. They
include sending a term 〈t〉, receiving into a variable (x), matching a term against a
pattern (t/q(x)), and creating a new value (νx). A strand is a list of actions. The
idea is that they should be the subsequent actions of a single role in a protocol.
For example, the strand [(νx)〈x〉] represents a role in which a principal generates x
and then sends out a message containing the freshly generated value. Since some
actions of a role may be mutually independent, they can in principle be executed
in any order. Different strands can thus be semantically equivalent. A cord is an
equivalence class of behaviorally indistinguishable strands. We use the word process
to refer to a principal executing an instance of a role. Table A.1 summarizes the
formal definition of cords. In addition to the sequence of actions, a cord has an
input interface and an output interface. As the name suggests, the output interface
represents the output of that cord. The input interface is used to provide initial
data to a cord. These input parameters (called static parameters) can represent
data known apriori (e.g. signing key) or data that becomes known by executing
another cord via its output interface.
A.2 Cord Spaces and Runs
A cord space is a multiset of cords that may interact via communication. We use
⊗ for multiset union and [ ] for the empty multiset. The runs of a protocol arise as
reaction sequences of cord spaces. The basic reactions within a cord space are shown
in Table A.2, with the required side conditions for each reaction shown below them.
The substitution (t/x) is assumed to act on the strand left of it, viz S′. As usual, it
is assumed that no free variable becomes bound after substitution, which can always
be achieved by renaming the bound variables. Reaction (A.1) is a send and receive
interaction, showing the simultaneous sending of term t by the first cord, with the
receiving of t into variable x by the second cord. We call this an external action
because it involves an interaction between two cords. The other reactions all take
place within a single cord. We call these internal actions. Reaction (A.2) is a basic
pattern match action, where the cord matches the pattern p(t) with the expected
pattern p(x), and substitutes t for x. Reaction (A.3) is a decryption pattern match
action, where the cord matches the pattern {|p(t)|}y with the decryption pattern
{|p(x)|}y and substitutes t for x. Reaction (A.4) is a signature verification pattern
match action. Finally, reaction (A.5) shows the binding action where the cord
creates a new value that doesn’t appear elsewhere in the cordspace, and substitutes
that value for x in the cord to the right. The intuitive motive for the condition
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(names) N ::= Xˆ variable name
Aˆ constant name
(basic keys) K0 ::= k constant key
y variable key
N name
(keys) K ::= K0 basic key
K0 inverse key
(role id) η ::= s variable role-id
c¯ constant role-id
(process) P ::= N, η





t, t tuple of terms
{|t|}K term encrypted with key K
{|t|}K term signed with key K
(actions) a ::=  the null action
〈t〉 send a term t
(x) receive term into variable x
(νx) generate new term x
(t/q(x1, . . . , xn)) match term t to pattern q(x1, . . . , xn)
(basic terms) b ::= x | c | N | K basic terms allowed in patterns
(basic patterns) p ::= b, . . . , b tuple pattern
(patterns) q ::= p basic pattern
{|p|}K decryption pattern
{|p|}K signature verification pattern
(strands) S ::= aS | a
Table A.1
Syntax of terms, actions and strands
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[S(x)S′]⊗ [T 〈t〉T ′]⊗ C .. [SS′(t/x)] ⊗ [TT ′]⊗ C (A.1)
[S (p(t)/p(x)) S′]⊗ C .. [SS′(t/x)] ⊗ C (A.2)
[S ({|p(t)|}y/{|p(x)|}y)S
′]⊗ C .. [SS′(t/x)] ⊗ C (A.3)
[S ({|p(t)|}y/{|p(t)|}y)S
′]⊗ C .. [SS′]⊗ C (A.4)
[S(νx)S′]⊗ C .. [SS′(m/x)] ⊗ C (A.5)
Where the following conditions must be satisfied:
(A.1) FV (t) = ∅
(A.2) FV (t) = ∅
(A.3) FV (t) = ∅ and y bound
(A.4) FV (t) = ∅
(A.5) x 6∈ FV (S) and m 6∈ FV (C) ∪ FV (S) ∪ FV (S′)
Table A.2
Basic reaction steps
FV (t) = ∅ should be clear: a term cannot be sent, or tested, until all of its free
variables are instantiated.
A.3 Protocols
A protocol is defined by a finite set of roles, such as initiator, responder and server,
each representing the actions of a participant in a protocol session. In representing
protocol roles by cords, it is useful to identify the principal who carries out the role.
Also, since the same principal might engage in multiple sessions in the same role
(e.g., principal Aˆmight be the initiator in two sessions at the same time), associating
a role-id with the cord allows us to distinguish between the actions carried out in
the different sessions. A principal executing an instance of a role is referred to as a
process.
The protocol intruder is capable of taking any of several possible actions, includ-
ing receiving a message, decomposing it into parts, decrypting the parts if the key is
known, remembering parts of messages, and generating and sending new messages.
This is the standard “Dolev-Yao model”, which appears to have developed from
positions taken by Needham and Schroeder [32] and a model presented by Dolev
and Yao [8]. A run of a protocol is a sequence of reaction steps from an initial
configuration. An initial configuration is determined by a set of principals, a subset
of which are designated as honest, a cord space constructed by assigning one or
more roles to each honest principal, and an intruder cord that may use only the
secret keys of dishonest principals. A particular initial configuration may give rise
to many possible runs. Intuitively, a protocol has a property if in all runs of the
protocol arising from all possible initial configurations, that property is preserved.
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B Semantics of Protocol Logic
The formulas of the logic are interpreted over runs, which are finite sequences of
reaction steps from an initial configuration. An equivalent view, consistent with
the execution model used in defining Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) semantics, is to
think of a run as a linear sequence of states. Transition from one state to the next
is effected by an action carried out by some principal in some role. A formula is
true in a run if it is true in the last state of that run.
The main semantic relation, Q, R |= φ, may be read, “formula φ holds for run R
of protocol Q.” If Q is a protocol, then let Q¯ be the set of all initial configurations
of protocol Q, each including a possible intruder cord. Let Runs(Q¯) be the set
of all runs of protocol Q with intruder, each a sequence of reaction steps within
a cord space. If φ has free variables, then Q,R |= φ if we have Q,R |= σφ for
all substitutions σ that eliminate all the free variables in φ. We write Q |= φ if
Q, R |= φ for all R ∈ Runs(Q¯).
In presenting the inductive definition of Q,R |= φ below, for φ without free
variables, we use the following notation to describe a reaction step of cord calculus:
EVENT (R,X,P,n,x) ≡
((






In words, EVENT(R,X,P,n,x) means that in run R, process X executes actions
P , receiving data n into variables x, where n and x are the same length. We
use the notation LAST (R,X,P,n,x) to denote that the last event of run R is
EVENT (R,X,P,n,x).
Action Formulas:
• Q, R |= Send(A,m) if LAST (R,A, 〈m〉, ∅, ∅).
• Q, R |= Receive(A,m) if LAST (R,A, (x),m, x).
• Q, R |= New(A,m) if LAST (R,A, (νx),m, x).
• Q, R |= Decrypt(A, {|m|}K) if Q, R |= Has(A, {|m|}K)
∧ LAST (R,A, ({|m|}K/{|x|}K),m, x)
Note: Decrypt(A,n) is false if n 6= {|m|}K for some m and K.
• Q, R |= Verify(A, {|m|}K) if Q, R |= Has(A, {|m|}K)
∧ Q, R |= Has(A,m)
∧ Q, R |= Has(A,K)
∧ LAST (R,A, ({|m|}K/{|m|}K), ∅, ∅)
Note: Verify(A,n) is false if n 6= {|m|}K for some m and K.
Other Formulas:
• Q, R |= Has(A,m) if there exists an i such that Hasi(A,m) where Hasj is defined
by induction on j as follows:
(Has0(A,m) if ((m ∈ FV (R|A))
∨ EVENT (R,A, (νx),m, x)
224
∨ EVENT (R,A, (x),m, x)
and Hasi+1(A,m) if (Hasi(A,m
′)
∧ ((m′ = {|p(t)|}K ∧m = t
∧ EVENT (R,A, (m′/{|p(y)|}K ), t, y))
∨ (m′ = p(t) ∧m = t












ab) ∧m = gba)
Intuitively, Has0 holds for terms that are known directly, either as a free variable
of the role, or as the direct result of receiving or generating the term. Hasi+1
holds for terms that are known by applying i operations (decomposing via pattern
matching, composing via encryption or tupling, or by computing a Diffie-Hellman
secret) to terms known directly.
• Q, R |= Fresh(A,m) ifQ, R |= (New(A,m)∨(New(A,n)∧m = g(n)))∧¬(Send(A,m′)∧
m ⊆ m′).
• Q, R |= Honest(A) if A ∈ HONEST(C) in initial configuration C for R.
• Q, R |= Contains(t1, t2) if t2 ⊆v t1. t2 is a visible subterm of t1, t2 ⊆v t1, if t2 ⊆ t1
and it is not the case that all occurrences of t2 in t1 are as parameters of one-way
functions. For example, n 6⊆v g(n). The only one-way function that we consider
here is the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation function, g(x).
• Q, R |= (φ1 ∧ φ2) if Q, R |= φ1 and Q, R |= φ2
• Q, R |= ¬φ if Q, R 6|= φ
• Q, R |= ∃x.φ if Q, R |= (d/x)φ, for some d, where (d/x)φ denotes the formula
obtained by substituting d for x in φ.
• Q, R |= φ if Q, R′ |= φ, where R′ is a (not necessarily proper) prefix of R.
Intuitively, this formula means that in some state in the past, formula φ is true.
• Q, R |= φ if Q, R′ |= φ, where R = R′e, for some event e. Intuitively, this formula
means that φ is true in a state if φ is true in the previous state.
Modal Formulas:
• Q, R |= φ1 [P ]A φ2 if R = R0R1R2, for some R0, R1 and R2, and either P does
not match R1|A or P matches R1|A and Q, R0 |= σφ1 implies Q, R0R1 |= σφ2,
where σ is the substitution matching P to R1|A.
• Q, R |= [P ]A φ if R = R1R2, for some R1 and R2, and either P does not match
R1|A or P matches R1|A and Q, R1 |= σφ, where σ is the substitution matching
P to R1|A.
Note: The semantics of Q, R |= [P ]A φ can be expressed in terms of the semantics
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of Q, R |= φ1 [P ]A φ2 by setting φ1 to true and requiring that R0 be empty.
Semantic Entailment:
• Γ |= φ if Q |= Γ implies Q |= φ. Γ denotes a set of formulas. Intuitively, if in
every run of Q all the formulas in Γ are true, then in every run of Q, formula φ
is also true.
C Soundness of Temporal Ordering and Composition
Rules
In this section, we prove the soundness of the composition rules and some of the
temporal ordering rules. The soundness proof of the rest of the proof system is
quite similar to our previous work [9].
AxiomAF3 states that if a processX creates a fresh value n and then sends out a
message containing it as a subterm, then any action carried out by any other process
which involves n (e.g. if Y receives a message containing n inside a signature),
happens after the send action. Assume that X 6= Y , n ⊆ m,a2 and
Q |= Fresh(X,n)[〈m〉P ]X (φ ⊃ a2(Y )). (C.1)
We need to show that
Q |= Fresh(X,n)[〈m〉P ]X (φ ⊃ After(Send(X,m), a2)). (C.2)
Let R = R0R1R2 be a run of Q such that R1 matches 〈m〉P under substitution σ
and Q,R0 |= Fresh(X,n). We need to prove that
Q,R0R1 |= σ(φ ⊃ After(Send(X,m), a2)). (C.3)
When Q,R0R1 |= σ¬φ then C.3 holds trivially. On the other hand, when Q,R0R1 |=
σφ, it follows from C.1 that Q,R0R1 |= a2(Y ). In this case C.3 follows from the
semantics of formulas Fresh(a,m) and a2(Y ).
Axiom AF4 is similar except for the fact that the roles of X and Y are reversed.
Soundness of AF4 can be easily verified, using the same reasoning as in the proof
of soundness for AF3.
The weakening rule W states that a formula φ which is provable from a set
of hypotheses, Γ, remains provable if additional formulas are added to the set of
hypotheses. This rule is trivially sound since Γ |= φ implies Γ ∪ Γ′ |= φ.
The protocol composition rule C1 gives us a way of sequentially composing two
roles P and P ′ when post-condition of P , matches the pre-condition or P ′. Assume
that Q is a protocol and Γ is the set of formulas such that Γ |= φ1[P ]Aφ2 and
Γ |= φ2[P
′]Aφ3. We need to prove that Γ |= φ1[P ;P
′]Aφ3. When Q 6|= Γ this
is trivially true. Assume that Q |= Γ, now it has to be that Q |= φ1[P ]Aφ2 and
Q |= φ2[P
′]Aφ3. Let R = R0R1R2 be a run of Q such that R1 matches P ;P
′|A
under substitution σ and Q,R0 |= σφ1. Run R can be written as R = R0R
′
1R
′′
1R2
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